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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to identify credit rationing socio-demographic determinants to 
Islamic microfinance to achieve welfare improving goals in three Bottom of the 
Economic Pyramid (BOP) regions: Yogyakarta, East Lombok and Makassar, South 
Sulawesi, Indonesia. Another primary focus of this study is to highlight the suggested 
solutions from Islamic microfinance practitioners to overcome the challenges in the 
practice of credit rationing assessment. 2,650 borrowers at the BOP in 26 Islamic 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in Indonesia were selected based on cluster sampling 
and purposive sampling methods. A questionnaire is adapted from several previous 
studies. Multinomial logistics regression is used in this paper. Results show that the 
determinant of credit rationing based on socio-demographic factors, reflecting certain 
socio-demographic factors that include age, gender, account balance, dependents, 
salary, monthly income, formal education, access to financing facility in the previous 
year, distance, and years of saving, has significant influence on the probability of 
getting financing. Thus, in order to reduce the credit-rationing problem, the major 
implications from this study are that Baitul Maal wa Tamwil (BMT) should enhance 
the participation of women, using monthly income rather than salary determinants, 
provide credit plus financing and realize a one village one BMT program. The solutions 
would enhance the participation of BOP borrowers at BMT.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of misplacement of to the targeted segment of the society, particularly 
to those at the bottom of the economic pyramid (BOP) is one of the major issues 
in microfinance. The lack of economic activity among the poor borrowers is a 
significant barrier to microcredit accessibility, resulting in the poor being unable 
to attain a stable source of income. Such conditions suggest that when several 
individuals want to access a microfinance facility, they cannot do so because they 
face the credit rationing problem (Shankar, 2013). In addition, the problems not 
only occur in small MFIs, but also in successful micro-credit programs, such as 
Grameen Bank, in which borrowers sometimes face the issue of limited accessibility 
to credit (Vasimalai and Narender, 2007).
Therefore, this study will discuss socio-demographic determinants of credit 
rationing. Specific factors in the socio-demographic determinants of credit rationing 
include gender (Vitor et al., 2014; Cheng and Ahmed, 2014; Fletschner, 2009; Chiu 
et al., 2014; Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Mijid and Bernasek, 2013; Zeller, 
1994), income (Duca and Rosenthal, 1991; Zeller, 1994), distance (Zeller, 1994), 
financing duration (Carling and Lundberg, 2005; Ferri and Murro, 2014), savings 
duration (Vitor et al., 2014; Dusuki, 2008), education level (Al-Azzam, Hill, and 
Sarangi, 2012; Duong and Izumida, 2002; Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011), 
marital status (Cheng and Ahmed, 2014; Papias and Ganesan, 2010), dependency 
(Duong and Izumida, 2002; Zeller, 1994) and whether or not the head of household 
is the credit applicant (Duong and Izumida, 2002; Mason, 2014; Togba, 2012).
In fact, the lowest income groups face more complex problems of credit rationing 
than higher income groups despite the fact that microcredit programs are designed 
to target households at the BOP (Khoi et al., 2013). Although credit rationing is 
not necessarily the source of the poverty trap, it reinforces the occurrences of the 
poverty trap. People at BOP who face credit-rationing problems will find it difficult 
to meet their daily needs because they have no income. The cheap credit policy of 
the governments in numerous developing countries is generally not effective (Jia, 
Heidhues, and Zeller, 2010). The compromise rate on margin discourages savings, 
distorts factor prices and fails in the proper substitution of labor for land and 
capital, paralyzes institutional lenders and excludes those at the BOP, particularly 
the poor and small farmers. 
Furthermore, the issues of credit rationing mentioned earlier are also prevalent 
in the practice of Islamic microfinance in Indonesia. Approximately 28.07 million 
people, or 11.37% of the total Indonesian population, are categorized as those 
in the BOP, having an average monthly income of around US$24 per month or 
less, based on Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2014). 
Such a condition is reflected not only in terms of minimum income, but also lack 
of education, lack of accessibility to clean water, health provisions, and proper 
sanitation (Rokhman, 2013). 
In the specific case of Indonesia, an issue of minimum participation of 
borrowers in Indonesia’s formal financial institutions often appears. For instance, 
in 2014 the percentage of accounts at formal financial institutions for customers 
aged more than 15 years old was only 36% of the total population, compared to 
20% in 2011. Many borrowers preferred borrowing from other channels, such as 
from friends and relatives, up to 41% in 2014. As a result, the data suggest that 
the majority of people at the BOP still faced credit rationing problems because 
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they prefer to borrow from informal sources than formal sources. According to 
Turvey et al. (2010), one of the major reasons why many people choose friends and 
relatives as a source of funding rather than other informal funding alternatives in 
Indonesia is because other sources, such as loan sharks, impose high interest rate, 
which is forbidden in Islamic practice.
In dealing with this problem, the Islamic MFIs must conduct proper 
identification of credit rationing determinants in that people at the BOP would 
have ample accessibility to financing. The specific research objective (RO) of this 
study is to analyze factors determining credit rationing to Muslims at the BOP in 
the BMT in Indonesia. The contribution of measuring credit-rationing determinants 
in Indonesia Islamic microfinance will allow lenders to know how to screen and 
assess the risk of the client. This study also provides significant information on 
the factors that need to be considered as important in an attempt to reduce the 
problems of credit rationing by BMT. The results of this study could improve 
access to the required amount of credit in Islamic MFI. The information would 
also help stakeholders in the Islamic MFI sectors to improve access to credit from 
BMT. This study also provides socio-demographic characteristics in predicting the 
financing amount received in Indonesia. It is important to know socio-demographic 
determinants, which influence credit rationing. If socio-demographic information 
about Islamic MFI borrowers were a useful means of screening, borrowers’ ability 
to pay would be related to variation in loan size (Mason, 2014). 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Background Theory
2.1.1. Theory of Credit Rationing
A simple definition of credit rationing signifies an occasion when borrowers 
demanded more credit amount than the factual credit they received (Ferri and 
Murro, 2014). Credit rationing is also referred to as a condition in which individuals 
who need credit are not able to apply for the credit or applicants are not offered 
the desired amount they applied for (Vitor et al., 2014). 
Further, credit rationing is also reflected in a condition where borrowers 
propose a specified amount of funding, but lenders could either totally reject 
or partially reject their requests (Jia, Heidhues, and Zeller, 2010). Accordingly, 
people who apply for financing face one of two possible outcomes: either the 
financing application is fully granted or rejected. Two types of rejection include 
(1) a complete rejection where applicants do not get any financing at all, and (2) 
a partial rejection where borrowers propose a funding amount but only partially 
granted. Ultimately such applicants who are discouraged, completely rejected, or 
partially rationed fall under the category of the credit rationing condition. 
The problem of credit rationing occurs when lenders increase interest rates 
or supply a smaller loan amount than what is demanded. This practice, however, 
is not limited only to the interest rate ceiling and the gap between supply and 
demand. In addition, the relationship between borrowers and lenders plays an 
important role in this situation. In practice, honest borrowers only accept a loan 
contract that they expect to repay; whereas, dishonest borrowers default on loans 
at whatever the cost of default (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). The concept of credit 
rationing has been developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who stated that:
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 “Why is credit rationed? Perhaps the most basic tenet of economics is that market 
equilibrium entails supply equaling demand; that if demand should exceed supply, price 
will rise, decreasing demand and/or increasing supply until demand and supply are 
equated at the new equilibrium price. So if prices do their job, rationing should not exist.”
Consequently, credit rationing initially occurs when demand for funding is 
greater than supply. For instance, potential borrowers who are rejected by a bank 
tend to not be able to get funding even if they indicate that they want to pay more 
or possess high value collateral, which could be due to increased risk of the bank’s 
loan portfolio (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Under such a condition, the equaling of 
supply and demand of loanable funds will not be achieved, and credit restriction 
and rationing will occur. 
The issue of asymmetric information is the main reason behind the existence of 
the credit rationing condition. Asymmetric information occurs when lenders have 
no adequate information about potential borrowers (de Meza and Webb, 2000). 
Because of asymmetric information, certain borrowers are unable to obtain loans 
at any rates even though there is an ample supply of credit (Dubofsky, 1985).
2.1.2. Socio-Demographic Determinants of Credit Rationing: at Glance
Several socio-demographic factors act as determinants and influence credit 
rationing. Zeller (1994) conducted a study on the determinants of loan rationing 
by formal and informal lenders. Based on longitudinal research of 189 random 
households in ten villages in three agro-ecological regions in Madagascar, the 
study found that the determinants used by formal and informal lenders are the 
same in terms of obtaining and using information about the creditworthiness of 
the credit applicants. The informal and formal lenders’ decisions to approve a loan 
request were based on the applicants’ household income and debt as an indicator 
of repayment ability. Poor and medium-income households had to pay higher 
interest rates than the rich households did even though the poor households had a 
better record of debt repayment than their richer counterparts did. Such a practice 
implies that people at the BOP are treated as untrustworthy and, therefore, 
categorized as risky borrowers.
Moreover, Mason (2014) found that individual characteristics such as gender 
and age play important roles in the incidence of credit rationing. Although being 
a woman is not a significant predictor of credit rationing, it is strongly associated 
with receiving smaller loans than men receive. Poorer households and households 
with heads of an older age are more likely to apply for loans from informal sources 
(Simtowe et al., 2008), which is due to the perceived higher risks associated with 
poorer and older borrowers. Social network and family relations remain important 
for access to informal loans. A negative relation between age and demand may also 
be reflected in the complexity of the loan application and approval procedures for 
formal and microfinance loans. 
2.2. Previous Studies
Based on the literature review, a variation based on conceptual and empirical 
testing occurs among rural clients of the credit market, which due to different 
geographical contexts and socio-demographic set-ups as well as in different 
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business, economic and financial environments. Table 1 summarizes the literature 
on socio-demographic variables influencing credit rationing. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data
A five-step procedure of sampling to minimize potential sampling errors based on 
Malhotra’s method (Malhotra, 1999) was used in this research:
1. Defining target population;
2. Determining the sampling frame;
3. Selecting the sampling technique;
4. Determining the sample size; and
5. Executing the sampling process.
The population and samples in this study were divided into two based on 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitatively, the population in this 
study is the group of poor Muslim who applies or intended to apply for financing 
in West Nusa Tenggara Barat, Yogyakarta, and South Sulawesi. The samples reflect 
the three highest numbers of poor people and the regions with the lowest poverty 
line level. Other criteria are based on where BMT are established. 
Moreover, the samples were selected from percentage of BOP to total 
population in a region and not based on the real BOP population because the 
percentage of BOP to total population represented the real BOP condition than 
BOP population. The criteria for sample size is non-bias and data representative. 
Cluster sampling is selected in this study. Based on Krejcie and Morgan (1970), 
387 samples are adequate for a population of 1 million. Table 2 shows the region 
and samples: 
Table 2.
Region and Samples
No Region
Real BOP 
Population
Total BMT 
Existence 
(Central BMT 
Data)
Sample
Total 
Sample
1 Sulawesi Selatan 1.085.800 29 1004
2 Nusa Tenggara Barat 816.620 10 461
3 Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 532.590 40 1185
Total 2,650
Moreover, the sampling requirements for quantitative analysis are:
1. Muslims at the BOP who had lower financing nominal (under IDR10,000,000); 
2. Members of BMT for more than one year; 
3. Were married;
4. Had a child/children; and
5. Had lived in Nusa Tenggara Barat or DI Yogyakarta or Sulawesi Selatan for 
more than one year.
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3.2. Model Development
In order to analyze factors determining credit rationing to Muslims at the BOP in 
the semi-formal Islamic MFIs in Indonesia, the following variables are considered.
i. Dependent Variable: Credit Rationing
A condition in which the lender rations credit and borrowers cannot obtain the 
amount of credit, which they desire. This will serve as the dependent variable, 
which is defined as partially satisfied (not fully granted), completely rejected (no 
financing granted) and fully satisfied (fully granted financing) (Vitor et al., 2014). 
ii. Independent Variables 
Socio-demographic determinants include age, gender, proximity (distance to 
Islamic MFI), years of savings, balance of savings, number of dependents, head 
of household, having salary, income, years of formal education, and access to 
previous financing.
Age: A person of the productive age has a greater chance of getting the amount 
of loan he requires. Old and young tend to demand a smaller amount of loan 
because the formal sector thinks that they only increase costs of transactions 
(Ahiawodzi and Sackey, 2010). This is consistent with the idea that the younger 
borrowers have higher possibility of default because they have no stable sources 
of income, while older age persons are associated with high risk of repayment 
especially those who are in the pension age. Age indicates earning capacity (Mason, 
2014). Age will increase the probability of access to microfinance because older 
people are believed to accumulate more wealth and can control their resources 
(Khoi et al., 2013). Age also serves as a proxy for accountability and commitment 
to repay the loan.
Gender: In the microfinance literature, the male group is recognized as those 
who have greater access to credit compared with female especially in banks or 
formal microfinance institutions (Mijid and Bernasek, 2013; Vitor et al., 2014). The 
same case also occurs in rural credit cooperatives where males have greater access 
than woman does (Cheng and Ahmed, 2014; Fletschner, 2009). The reason is that 
women have no experience related to income generating activities, in that they are 
expected to face difficulty in repaying a financing given by the MFIs (Fletschner, 
2009). Consequently, they face higher credit rationing. Many Islamic MFIs are now 
focused to provide funding to woman in order to enhance the participation of 
woman.
Proximity (Distance to Islamic MFI): People at the BOP who live nearer to the 
Islamic MFI have easier access to financing. Proximity is projected to reduce the 
probability of borrowers being rationed (Carling and Lundberg, 2005). Based 
on the literature, a distance of two kilometers or less is the standard distance of 
acceptance which is measured only by walking distance that does not require the 
need to take public transportation that would incur cost (Vitor et al., 2014). The 
MFI would also face greater risk when they provide funding to distant borrowers 
(Carling and Lundberg, 2005). 
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Years of savings: Years of savings is used as a proxy of consumer loyalty and 
trust in microfinance (Vitor et al., 2014). It can be measured by the number of years 
that the borrowers have been saving with the MFIs. The longer the years of savings 
with the MFIs, the lower the probability of credit being rationed (Zeller, 1994). 
This is because the years of savings prove the creditworthiness of the borrowers 
and will decrease the credit rationing occurrence (Chiu et al., 2014). 
Balance of savings: The more balance of savings with the MFI means the more 
access to financing because savings can be considered as collateral. A borrower 
with a positive balance in his/her bank account has a higher probability of securing 
a loan in full (Vitor et al., 2014). This can increase their creditworthiness (Dusuki, 
2008; Vitor et al., 2014). Since a balance of savings serves as collateral, credit 
rationing will be reduced as the balance increase (Vitor et al., 2014). 
Number of dependents: While generally a dependent is defined as someone who 
requires financial or other support, in the context of this study dependents were 
children under 13 years old or younger who are under the care of a person (Vitor 
et al., 2014). In general, the BOP family with many dependents is not likely even to 
be able to feed itself (Bao Duong and Izumida, 2002). As a consequence, the more 
number of dependents, the more credit rationing occurrence (Zeller, 1994). 
Head of household: A head of household is defined as a person who is responsible 
to their family. If the borrower candidate is the head of a household, she or he 
usually has a lower problem of credit rationing since he or she also act as the main 
breadwinner (Mason, 2014; Togba, 2012). Moreover, a married female household 
heads also appear to have more financial freedom than single one (Shaw, 2004).
Having salary: Having salary is not a determinant of credit rationing in informal 
and formal credit groups since many borrowers work in the informal sector which 
is characterized by unstable income (Zeller, 1994). However, having no salary 
indicates a failure of getting micro personal loan because of bad qualification (Saad 
and Anuar, 2014). A higher salary will enhance the standard of living (Moruf O 
and Oyedele K, 2014).
Income: Source of income is an important factor in credit rationing. If the 
income increases, credit rationing will decrease (Duca and Rosenthal, 1991; Zeller, 
1994; Khoi et al., 2013). According to Mirghani et al. (2011), the common sources of 
income for Muslims at the BOP come from their work in small medium enterprises 
(SMEs). Islamic MFI should enhance the ability to reach consumers by supporting 
the SMEs because most of people at BOP have sources of income that come from 
the SME (Fararah and Al-Swidi, 2013). 
Years of formal education: The more educated the person is, the easier it is for 
him or her to get financing, thus the lesser the incidence of credit constraint. Level 
of education is a proxy for how well a person can handle the problems of credit 
rationing because the more educated would have more knowledge about how to 
get financing granted (Duong and Izumida, 2002; Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 
2011; Azzam et al., 2012; Togba, 2012; Papias and Ganesan, 2010; Jia, Heidhues, 
and Zeller, 2010; Cheng and Ahmed 2014).
Access to previous financing: Having access to previous financing increases the 
reputation of borrowers especially those who have previous punctual repayment 
of loans records (Petrick, 2004). In practice, Islamic microfinance only provides 
financing if the previous financing has been repaid (Rahman, 2010). Murabaha and 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, Number 3, 2019 653
musharakah are rarely given to first time clients. They are usually given to clients 
who have had access to previous financing and showed good repayment record 
(Rulindo, 2012).
The summary of socio-demographic variables influencing credit rationing is 
shown in Table 3 below:
Table 3.
Summary of Socio-demographic Variables Influences to Credit Rationing
Socio-demographic 
Variables
Relevant Literature
Age (-)(Ahiawodzi and Sackey, 2010), (-)(Mason, 2014), (-)(Khoi et al., 2013), (-)(Ali and Deininger, 2014)
Gender (1=male)
(0=female)
(-)(Mijid and Bernasek, 2013), (-)(Vitor et al., 2014), (-)(Cheng and Ahmed, 
2014),(-)(Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011), (-)(Fletschner, 2009), (≠)
(Zeller, 1994), (≠)(Chiu, Khantachavana, and Turvey, 2014), (≠)(Papias 
and Ganesan, 2010), (≠)(Togba, 2012), (≠)(Mason, 2014), (≠)(Drakos and 
Giannakopoulos, 2011), (≠)(Agier and Szafarz, 2013), (≠)(Khoi et al., 2013)
Having salary (≠)(Zeller, 1994), (-)(Saad and Anuar, 2014), (-)(Moruf O and S, 2014)
Income  (-)(Duca and Rosenthal, 1991), (-)(Zeller, 1994) (-)(Khoi et al., 2013), (≠)
(Turvey et al., 2011), (≠)(Vitor et al., 2014)
Proximity (distance)
(≠)(Papias and Ganesan, 2010), (≠)(Vitor et al., 2014), (≠)(Carling and 
Lundberg, 2005), formal MFI(≠)(Zeller, 1994), Informal MFI(+)(Zeller, 1994)
Years of savings (-)(Khoi et al., 2013), (-)(Ferri and Murro, 2014), (-)(Carling and Lundberg, 
2005), (-)(Vitor et al., 2014)
Savings amount (-)(Dusuki, 2008), (-)(Vitor et al., 2014), (≠)(Zeller, 1994), (≠)(Chiu et al., 2014)
Year(s) of Formal 
Education
(-)(Duong and Izumida, 2002), (-)(Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011), (-)
(Azzam et al., 2012), (-)(Togba, 2012), (-)(Papias and Ganesan, 2010), (-)(Jia, 
Heidhues, and Zeller, 2010), (-)(Cheng and Ahmed, 2014) (≠)(Cheng and 
Ahmed, 2014) 
Dependency (+)(Bao Duong and Izumida, 2002), (+)(Zeller, 1994)
Head of household
(-)(Bao Duong and Izumida, 2002), (-)(Mason, 2014), (-)(Togba, 2012), (-)
(Shaw, 2004)
Access on the previous 
financing
(-)(Petrick, 2004), (-)(Rahman, 2010), (-)(Rulindo, 2012)
Eleven hypotheses are formulated to analyze the socio-demographic 
determinants of credit rationing:
(i) Older people have negative influence on credit rationing occurrence;
(ii) Men have more negative influence on credit rationing occurrence than 
women;
(iii) Having a salary has no influence on credit rationing occurrence;
(iv) Higher income has negative influence on credit rationing occurrence;
(v) Proximity has no influence on credit rationing occurrence;
(vi) Years of savings has negative influence on credit rationing occurrence;
(vii) Positive balance of savings has negative influence on credit rationing 
occurrence;
Notes: (-) indicates having negative influence to credit rationing, (+) indicates having positive influence to credit 
rationing, (≠) indicates having no influence to credit rationing
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(viii) Years of formal education has negative influence on credit rationing 
occurrence;
(ix) Number of dependents has positive influence on credit rationing occurrence;
(x) Head of household has negative influence on credit rationing occurrence; 
and
(xi) Access to previous financing has negative influence on credit rationing 
occurrence.
The model of credit rationing using demographic analysis is derived from 
borrowers assessment utility by Vitor et al. (2014). This model is derived from 
using the credit for current consumption, and next period consumption, using 
credit for production and capital valuation function when borrower uses the credit 
to invest. The baseline model is below:
Where,
 Wi = Borrowers’ assessment of utility
 Zi = Institutional factors
From equation (1), the lender decides whether to allocate the applicant all the 
credit applied for, reduce the amount requested or totally reject the application 
(Vitor et al., 2014; Zeller, 1994). This model will be tested in BMT. There is 
multinomial logistic model specified as follows:
(1)
Where, 
 CRi : credit rationing as dependent variable. This will be applied to three 
models:
 CR1: a dummy variable with a value of 0 if borrower at BOP is partially satisfied 
and 1 if the respondents are fully satisfied,
 CR2: a dummy variable with a value of 0 if borrower at BOP is completely 
rejected and 1 if the respondent is fully satisfied, 
 β1AGE: respondent’s age
 β2GEN: a gender, which is a dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if the 
respondent is male and 0 if female. 
 β3SAL: respondent’s salary, which takes a value of 1 if having salary and 0 if 
not having salary 
 β4INCOME: income if individual earn wage income is 1 and 0 if the other.
 β5PROXY: financial services proximity, which is described as poor people 
who live nearer to microfinance institutions and can be contacted. A dummy 
variable of value 1 is used when the distance between a Muslim at the BOP and 
a microfinance institution is between 0-2 km and 0 otherwise. 
(2)
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 β6SAVYEARS: length of period of savings, which is the duration of a BOP 
Muslim’s relationship with the financial institution used as a proxy for 
customer loyalty and trust. 
 β7BALDEPO: the positive balance on the borrower’s account with the financial 
institution. A dummy variable of value 1 is when the borrower has a positive 
balance and 0 otherwise. 
 β8EDUCYEAR: number of years of formal education. 
 β9DEPEDENTS: number of children under 13 years old or younger. 
 β10HOH: dummy variable if individual is head of household. It will be noted as 
1 and otherwise 0. 
 β11ACCESS: access on previous financing. A dummy variable of value 1 is 
given when a borrower has had access to previous financing and 0 otherwise.
3.3. Method
Logistic regression is used to explain the relationship between a set of covariate 
or explanatory variables and a dichotomous response variable (Hsieh, Li, and Lee, 
2013). Generally, such a regression is well suited for testing and describing the 
relationships between one or more categorical or continuous predictor variables 
and a categorical outcome variable (Peng, Lee, and Ingersoll, 2002). The difference 
between a linear and logistic regression model is reflected in the assumptions and 
the choice of parametric model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Logistic regression 
can accommodate categorical outcomes that are dichotomous (binary logistic) 
and polytomous (multinomial logistic). Logit is the log of the odds that an event 
occurs. Several assumptions of a logistic model based on Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(2000) include:
a. Normal distribution is no need in logistic regression but should use multivariate 
normal distribution;
b. The dependent variable should be heterochedastic meaning that there is no 
homogeneity in the variance assumption;
c. There is no assumption of normally distributed error terms;
d. Independent variables do not require to be interval and unbounded; and
e. A linier relationship between dependent and independent variables is not 
assumed. 
The logistic model equation is as bellow (Mahmood et al., 2014): 
Where: 
i. P(Y) is the probability of Y occurring;
ii. e is the base of natural logarithms; and
iii. βn is the regression coefficient variable of Xn
(3)
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IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Results
4.1.1. Demographic Statisticss
Of the total 2,760 questionnaires distributed, 2,650 completed questionnaires were 
returned, representing a 96.01% response rate. Eight cities in the Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta had a response rate 98.75% (1,185 valid questionnaires), 12 cities in 
South Sulawesi Selatan 95.62% (1,004 valid questionnaires), and West Tenggara 
Barat 90.39% (461 valid questionnaires). The relatively low response rate and low 
validity of the responses in West Nusa Tenggara Barat was probably because the 
typology of the region in remote area was difficult to access. The small of population 
was also the cause of a lower response rate. Table 4 describes the response rate in 
each province.
2,650 respondents in this analysis comprised 1,006 (37.96%) male and 1,644 
(62.04%) female. Table 5 shows that women suffered from the incidence of credit 
rationing (completely rejected and partially funding) more than men. Having 
salary and not having salary are equally distributed between 1,236 (46.64%) 
and 1,414 (53.36%). However, it is shown that people who have salary are more 
completely rejected in financing than those not having salary but this is lower in 
the case of partially funding. 
As many as 740 (27.92%) were respondents with an income under $100 per 
month, 829 (31.28%) were respondents with income $100-$150 and 882 (33.28%) 
were respondents with income of $151-$500, while only a small percentage had 
an income above $500, which means that most of respondents have a low-income 
level and can be categorized as people at the bottom of the economic pyramid. In 
Table 5, people who have lower income tend to suffer credit rationing (completely 
rejected and partially funding). Similarly, whether or not the respondents are the 
head of a household signifying the salary indicator reflects a somewhat equal 
distribution between 1,175 (44.34%) and 1,475 (55.66%). Besides, respondents who 
were not the head of a household had a lower credit rationing than those who 
were.
Table 5 shows that respondents with fewer generations of the family in the 
village dominate the number of respondents in this study. Around 1,635 (61.32% of 
total respondents) are people with 0 to 3 family generations in the village and 1,025 
(38.68% of total respondents) are those with more than three family generations 
in the village. Respondents with fewer family generations have a lower incidence 
of being completely rejected (37% of total respondents) but a higher incidence of 
being partially funding (59.14% of total respondents). 
Because of the dominance of those with fewer generation of the family, 
1,094 respondents (41.28%) had one to three relatives in the village, followed by 
819 (30.91%) who had more than three relatives in the village and 737 (27.81%) 
having no relatives. Respondents who have fewer relatives tend to be completely 
rejected for funding (45.09% of total respondents). Meanwhile, the level of 
education indicator shows that most respondents are having more than 9 years 
of formal education, 1,175 (44.34%), and the number of those having 7-9 years 
formal education is 719 (27.13%); this is followed by those having 1-6 years formal 
education, 491 (18.53%), and those having no formal education, around 265 (10%). 
This is expected since Indonesia has implemented the requirement for all citizens 
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to have at least 9 years of formal education. The more educated the respondents 
were, the lower the incidence of being completely rejected for funding. 
Since the characteristics of most of people at the bottom of the economic 
pyramid are that they live in remote areas which are far from financial institutions 
including BMT, this study shows that most of the respondents 1,695 (63.96%) are 
living more than 2 km from BMT. Respondents who live near to BMT have a lower 
incidence of credit rationing occurrence.
Furthermore, 34.19% respondents had around 3-5 years of savings and 34.60% 
respondents more than 5 years of savings. Finally, 2,218 respondents (83.70%) 
had access to previous financing, while only 242 respondents (16.30%) had no 
access to previous financing. The frequency of credit rationing incidence is lower 
for respondents who had access to previous financing than for respondents who 
had no access to previous financing. Table 5 shows the demographics of the 
respondents and its relation to credit rationing:
Table 5.
Demographic of the Respondents and Its Relation to Credit Rationing
Variable
Fully 
funding
Completely 
rejected
Partially 
funding
Total Percentage
Gender
Male 726 10 270 1,006 37.96
Woman 1,178 41 425 1,644 62.04
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Having Salary
Yes 897 28 311 1,236 46.64
No 1,007 23 384 1,414 53.36
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Monthly Income
Under $100 480 26 234 740 27.92
$100 - $150 1,063 13 253 829 31.28%
$151 - $500 195 9 178 882 33.28%
$501 - $1500 119 3 24 146 5.51%
More than 
$1500
47 0 6 53 2.00%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Head of household
Yes 854 24 297 1,175 44.34%
No 1,050 27 398 1,475 55.66%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Family generation 
in the village
0-3 1,195 19 411 1,625 61.32%
>3 709 32 284 1,025 38.68%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Years of formal 
education
None 159 16 90 265 10.00%
1-6 years 364 13 114 491 18.53%
7-9 years 519 11 189 719 27.13%
>9 years 862 11 302 1,175 44.34%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Relatives in the 
village
None 524 23 190 737 27.81%
1-3 780 15 299 1,094 41.28%
>3 600 13 206 819 30.91%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
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Table 5.
Demographic of the Respondents and Its Relation to Credit Rationing
Variable
Fully 
funding
Completely 
rejected
Partially 
funding
Total Percentage
Distance from 
house to BMT
0-2 km 705 21 229 955 36.04%
>2 km 1,199 30 466 1,695 63.96%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Years of savings
0-2 years 623 23 181 827 31.21%
3-5 years 605 16 285 906 34.19%
>5 years 676 12 229 917 34.60%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
Access to Previous 
financing
Yes 1,662 32 524 2,218 83.70%
No 242 19 171 432 16.30%
 1,904 51 695 2,650  
A multinomial logistic approach is used to answer this question since this 
approach can facilitate multi-categorical dependent variables (completely 
rejected, partially funding and fully funding) that are considered in this model. 
‘A full funding’ is used as the reference category in the dependent variable. The 
first step is to test the fitness of the model using a likelihood ratio and continues 
by measuring the strength between variables in the model using pseudo r-square. 
Moreover, a classification accuracy matrix is used to show the comparison between 
predicted and actual rating classified by the multinomial logistic model. Finally, 
model specification using multinomial logistics is used to test the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. 
4.1.2. Model Fitting Information
Several steps are conducted to measure the goodness-of-fit of the model. First, 
testing the model fitness uses a likelihood ratio test. Then, pseudo r-square is used 
to measure the strength between variables followed by classification accuracy. 
Table 6 shows the model fitting information of socio-demographic determinants 
of credit rationing. 
Table 6.
Goodness-of-fit, Pseudo r-square and Classification Accuracy of 
the Socio-Demographic Determinants of Credit Rationing
Model Fitting Information and 
Pseudo r-square
Model Fitting 
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio tests
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig.
Intercept only 3.451    
Final 3.181 270 36 0.000***
Pseudo R-Square
Cox and Snell 0.097
Nagelkerke 0.132
Overall Percentage of logistic 
classification accuracy 
72.20%
Note: (***) indicates significant at 1 percent
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(i) Likelihood ratio test
Chi-square is used to test the model fit. Chi-square measures the difference between 
the observed and the fitted value. Chi-square is derived from the likelihood ratio 
(LR) on which it is calculated from -2(maximized value of the likelihood function 
under the null hypothesis) – -2(the maximized value of fitted model) (Hosmer 
and Lemeshow, 2000). In this model, the LR chi square is 3,451-3,181=270. The 
chi-square test (ρ <= .05) means that we reject the null hypothesis. It means that the 
independents make a difference in predicting the dependent in logistic regression. 
Therefore, the model is fit.
(ii) Pseudo r-square
Pseudo r-square are approximately equivalent when the probability of an event is 
small (Mittlböck and Heinzl, 2001). Hair, et al. (1995) found that R2 tend to be low 
in the case of large samples and cross-sectional data. Pseudo r-square is sensitive 
to sample size, which allows this measurement to find very small differences that 
are statistically significant when the sample size becomes large. The model also 
shows small pseudo r-square. However, none of the statistics tests has a percentage 
of variance explained interpretation and should not be reported in such terms 
(Arundina, 2015). 
(iii) Classification accuracy 
A classification accuracy table concludes the result of a fitted logistic regression 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). However, an accurate or inaccurate classification 
does not address the criteria of goodness-of-fit because the distances between 
observed and expected values are unsystematic and within the variation of the 
model. It is only a supplement to the rigorous methods of assessment of fit. SPSS 
uses 50 per cent as the cut-off rate (Papias and Ganesan, 2009), which shows that 
the classification accuracy is above the benchmark level (50%) and the classification 
accuracy is satisfied.
4.1.3. Model Specification
To generate the model specification, the odds ratio is used in multinomial 
regression. It is a measure of association which is widely used to approximate 
how much more likely (or unlikely) it is for the outcome to be present among those 
with x=1 than among those with x=0. For example, the odds are nonnegative with 
a value more than 1, which means that a success is more likely than a failure. When 
odds = 4.0, a success is four times as likely as a failure. The probability of success is 
0.8 and failure 0.2. Therefore, the odds equal 0.8/0.2=4.0. An odds ratio value more 
than 1 in a given direction represents stronger association (Agresti, 2007). Table 7 
below shows the multinomial logistic result on socio-demographic determinants 
of credit rationing: 
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Table 7.
Multinomial Logistic Result on Socio-demographic Determinants of Credit 
Rationing
Variable
Y1 
(Completely 
rejected)
Y2 (partially funding)
B Exp (B) B Exp (B)
Intercept (β) -18.297*** -1.295**
Age (AGE) -0.030** 0.971 0.002 1.002
Gender: Man (GEN) -0.992** 0.371 0.226* 1.254
Distance to the nearest BMT: 0-2 km 
(PROXY)
-0.015 0.985 -0.181** 0.835
Years of savings: 0-2 years (SAVYEAR1) 0.214 1.239 -0.441*** 0.644
Years of savings: 3-5 years (SAVYEAR2) 0.19 1.209 0.177 1.194
Have positive account balance 
(BALDEPO) -1.104*** 0.332 -0.774*** 0.461
Number of children: 0-2 (DEPEDENTS1) -0.837** 0.433 0.509** 1.663
Number of children 3-5 (DEPEDENTS2) -0.648 0.523 0.596** 1.814
Head of household (HOH) 0.563 1.755 -0.228** 0.796
Having salary (SAL) 0.891*** 2.438 -0.044 0.957
Monthly income: under 100 (INCOME1) 18.019*** 6.691 1.246*** 3.475
Monthly income: 101-150 (INCOME2) 17.353*** 3.439 1.180*** 3.255
Monthly Income: 151-500 (INCOME3) 17.232*** 3.045 0.643 1.903
Monthly income: 501-1500 (INCOME4) 17.842*** 5.604 0.408 1.504
Years of formal education: none 
(EDUCYEAR1)
1.891** 6.626 0.344** 1.41
Years of formal education: 1-6 years 
(EDUCYEAR2)
1.143** 3.137 -0.246** 0.782
Years of formal education: 7-9 years 
(EDUCYEAR3)
0.693 2.000 0.041 1.042
Access on the previous financing 
(ACCESS) -2.1*** 0.122 -0.545*** 0.580
Notes:
a. The reference category for dependent variable is fully funded
b. Age is continuous variable
c. The reference of categorical variable of gender (woman), distance (>2km), savings years (>5 years), having positive 
account balance (no), number of children (>5), head of household (no), having salary (yes), monthly income 
(>$1500), years of formal education (>9 years), access on the previous financing (no) 
d. (***) indicates significant at 1 percent (**) indicates significant at 5 percent; (*) indicates significant at 10 percent
4.2. Analysis
From Equation (1), it can be inferred that there are several significant variables that 
influence credit rationing, i.e., age, gender, positive balance on borrowers account, 
salary, monthly income, dependencies, years of formal education and access to 
a financing facility in previous year. Similarly, Equation (2) also shows that the 
variables are significant except for salary. In addition, proximity and years of 
savings are also found significant. Further discussion on the variables is included 
below:
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(i) Age
The first determinant of credit rationing is age (AGE). The results show that with 
a one percent increase in respondent age, the respondent’s log-odds of getting 
completely rejected in financing will decrease 0.971 times. A unit increase in age 
(year) leads to a (1/0.971=1.0298) likelihood of being fully funded. 
This finding is aligned with Papias and Ganesan (2010) who found that 
younger borrowers would get lower acceptance in financing. Young borrowers are 
more consumptive in spending money compared with older borrowers who tend 
to be more careful in their spending. Moreover, an older age would increase the 
probability of access because older people can accumulate more wealth and control 
their resources. Age is also an indicator of good financing repayment (Khoi et al., 
2013). However, an exception is for borrowers who are not within the productive 
age group (too old) who face declining volume rationing with increasing age 
(Weber and Mussoff, 2013). Therefore, the empirical findings between age and 
credit rationing confirm the hypothesis of the study stating that older age has a 
negative influence on credit rationing.
(ii) Gender
The second variable that is shown to be an important determinant of credit 
rationing is gender (GEN). The result shows that the probability of men being 
completely rejected for financing is 0.371 lower compared with women. Men are 
(1/0.371=2.695) times more likely to be fully funded compared with women. It can 
be summarized that men have greater access to a full funding than women. In 
other words, the probability of women being completely rejected for financing is 
2.695 (i.e. 1/0.371) times greater than men do. This finding concurs the arguments 
proposed by Mijid and Bernasek (2013) and Vitor et al. (2014) about the male group 
being recognized as those having greater access to credit compared with females 
especially from formal microfinance, such as a bank. The observation could be due 
to women having no experience relating to income generating activities; therefore, 
the creditors foresee that women borrowers would have difficulties repaying their 
debts (Fletschner, 2009).
However, the probability of women being partially funded in financing 
is 0.79744 times lower than men with lower statistical significance (at 10%). 
Females are (1/0.79744) 1.254 times more likely to be funded than partially funded 
compared with males. Although the probability of woman having their requested 
financing completely rejected is greater than for men, men have higher partial 
funding than women. In the case of getting their requested financing a partial 
funding, the eligibility of women to get fully funding is more than that for men. 
This means that BMT must have more focus on giving funding to women in order 
to increase women’s participation in the BMT. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the hypothesis stating the negative effect on men of getting credit rationing 
occurrence is confirmed in the cases of completely rejected to fully funding, while, 
in the case of partially rationing, the findings do not confirm the hypothesis.
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(iii) Dependents
Number of dependents is also shown to be statistically significant as a determinant 
in credit rationing. The result from Equation (1) shows that the probability of 
respondents who have a low number of dependents being completely rejected 
for financing is 0.433 lower than for the respondents who have a high number 
of dependents. BOP respondents with few dependents are (1/0.433) 2.31 times 
more likely to be fully funded compared with a high number of dependents. Bao 
Duong and Izumida (2002) found that a family with more dependents would have 
more credit rationing problems. This is because they face difficulty even to feed 
themselves resulting in an expected bad repayment. 
Moreover, the probability of respondents who have low dependencies to 
have partially funding in financing is 1.663 times and increase to 1.814 times if the 
respondents have higher dependencies. It means that the person who has higher 
dependencies is likely to face higher cases of partially funding. Zeller, 1994 also 
found the same situation of more credit rationing occurrence when borrowers have 
more dependants. It is concluded that the hypothesis stating that dependency has 
a positive influence on credit rationing occurrence is confirmed.
(iv) Positive balance on savings account
Savings in Islamic microfinance can be considered as collateral. Several BMTs do 
not ask for collateral from their borrowers but require savings for every financing. 
Vitor et al. (2014) found that a positive balance on the borrowers’ savings account 
will enhance the probability of securing a loan in full (non-credit rationed). The 
results of this study show that respondents who have a positive savings account 
balance are less likely to have completely rejected in financing, with a probability 
0.332 lower compared with respondents who do not have a positive account 
balance. The positive amount of savings will enhance creditworthiness (Dusuki, 
2008; Vitor et al., 2014).
In the case of a partial funding in financing, respondents who had a positive 
savings account balance were less likely to get partial funding in financing with a 
probability 0.461 lower compared with respondents who did not have a positive 
account balance. Since savings serve as a collateral, a greater amount of savings 
will reduce the probability of credit rationing occurrence (Vitor et al., 2014). The 
empirical findings confirm the hypothesis of the study stating that a positive 
balance of savings has a negative influence on credit rationing occurrence. 
(v) Salary
Salary is an indicator of ability to repay financing. From the result of the study, it 
can be inferred that respondents who do not have a salary are more likely to have 
completely rejected in financing, with a probability 2.438 times higher compared 
with respondents who have a salary. Borrowers who have a regular salary will 
face lower credit rationing than borrowers who do not have regular salary because 
they are perceived to have a steady source of income which will used to repay the 
financing (Duca and Rosenthal, 1991; Zeller, 1994; Khoi et al., 2013). 
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However, such a result does not agree with Zeller (1994) who found an in-
significant relationship between credit rationing and having salary. One of 
reasons for the difference is that several BMTs borrowers work as employers 
and receives a monthly salary. Therefore, having a salary has influenced credit-
rationing conditions. Since the previous hypothesis stated that having a salary has 
no influence on credit rationing, the empirical findings related to having a salary 
and credit rationing are not confirmed. 
(vi) Monthly income
Monthly income is also a determinant of credit rationing in the BMT. The 
probability of respondents who had a low monthly income being completely 
rejected in financing is higher than for respondents who had a high monthly 
income according to the Equation (1). Moreover, the same condition also occurs in 
equation (2) that the probability of respondents who had a low monthly income 
being partially funding in financing is higher than for respondents who had a 
higher monthly income.
Monthly income is an indicator of repayment especially monthly repayment. 
In BMT, repayment will automatically be debited by BMT from the account of 
borrower with monthly income. The common sources of income of Muslims at 
the BOP come from small medium enterprise (SME) activities (Mirghani et al., 
2011). The same condition also occurred in BMT. Therefore, SME activities must be 
supported in order to enhance their ability to repay. In conclusion, the empirical 
findings confirm the hypothesis of the study stating that higher monthly income 
has a negative influence on credit rationing occurrence.
(vii) Year(s) of formal education
Year(s) of formal education is also a significant variable that influences credit 
rationing. From the Equation (1), it can be inferred that respondents who have 
lower number of years of formal education are more likely to have completely 
rejected for financing compared with respondents who have more high years 
of formal education. The same direction is seen in Equation (2) that found that 
respondents who had fewer years of formal education tend to have a higher 
incidence of a partial funding compared with respondents who had a greater 
number of years of formal education.
 Consequently, the more educated the person is, the easier it is for him to get 
financing. Years of formal education is an indicator of how well applicants are 
likely to handle credit rationing problem because they have more knowledge 
than those who are less educated (Duong and Izumida, 2002; Menkhoff and 
Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; Azzam et al., 2012; Togba, 2012; Papias and Ganesan, 
2010; Jia, Heidhues, and Zeller, 2010; Cheng and Ahmed 2014). Thus, the findings 
confirm the hypothesis stating that there is a negative influence of years of formal 
education on credit rationing occurrence.
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(viii) Access to financing facility in the previous year
From the Equation (1), it can be inferred that the probability of respondents who 
have had access to previous financing being completely rejected in financing is 0.122 
times lower compared with respondents who had no access to previous financing. 
It is summarized that respondents who had access to previous financing are 8.196 
times more likely to get a full funding compared with respondents who had no 
access to previous financing. In addition, Equation (2) shows the same pattern, 
that the probability of respondents who had access to the previous financing being 
partially funded in financing is 0.580 times lower compared with respondents who 
had no access to the previous financing. It is concluded that the findings confirm 
the hypothesis that access to previous financing has a negative influence on credit 
rationing occurrence.
This finding is contrary to that of with Becchett and Pisani (2008) who said 
that it is easy to get a financing from microfinance, having no knowledge of 
borrower’s previous track record. However, this type of case is not implemented 
in Islamic microfinance. A track record from previous financing is important 
as a measurement of character. A good track record means a good character. 
Reputation and background are the main attributes that indicate good repayment 
in Islamic microfinance (Obaidullah and Latiff, 2008). Since a good track record is 
important in Islamic microfinance, access to previous financing will reduce credit 
rationing occurrence. 
(ix) Proximity
Proximity or the distance of a borrower’s house from BMT is also a determinant of 
credit rationing. The result showed that respondents who lived less far away from 
BMT tend to get partially funding in financing with a probability 0.835 times lower 
compared with respondents who lived at a farther distance. Respondents who had 
to travel farther to BMT are (1/0.835=1.197) more likely to be completely rejected 
compared with respondents who have to travel less distance to BMT. People who 
lived closer to BMT will have easier access to financing since it will reduce the cost 
of monitoring because it does not require BMT staff to take public transportation 
that would incur a cost (Carling and Lundberg, 2005). A greater risk will be faced 
by MFIs if they provide funding to distant borrowers (Carling and Lundberg, 
2005). However, the finding does not confirm the hypothesis that proximity has 
no influence on credit rationing occurrence.
(x) Years of savings
Similar to the amount of savings, which conduct as collateral, years of savings, 
is a proxy for consumer loyalty and trust to microfinance? The result shows that 
the probability of respondents who had a lower number of years of savings being 
partially funding in financing requested is 0.644 times lower compared with those 
with a higher number of years of savings. This aligns with Zeller (1994) found a 
lower probability of being credit rationed if potential borrowers have more savings 
years because it increases their level of creditworthiness and is an indicator of a 
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respondent’s loyalty (Chiu et al., 2014). Finally, the hypothesis stating that years 
of savings has a negative influence on credit rationing occurrence is confirmed.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1. Conclusion
The findings based on the socio-demographic determinant indicate that age, being 
woman, not having a positive account balance, not having a salary, having only a 
few years of formal education and not having access to previous financing yield a 
positive probability of being rejected, rather than fully funded. First, age is indicator 
of maturity. An older age indicates more readiness to repay financing from BMT. 
Moreover, women are categorized as “not having income” so they suffer more in 
terms of completely being rejected in financing than do man. A positive account 
balance is a symbol of loyalty as loyalty will increase the level of trustworthiness 
and enhance the possibility of getting financing granted. Meanwhile, salary means 
regular income per month that can be used to repay financing every month. 
Besides, the same directions occurs in the probability of being partially funded 
to fully funded, except where gender is concerned in which men have more 
probability of getting partial funding than full funding. This finding is contrary 
to the case in completely rejected. Although women has more probability getting 
completely rejected in financing but their probability of getting partially funding 
is lower than fully funding compared with man. Additional variables in the case 
of partially rationing to fully funding are salary, proximity to BMT and years of 
savings. A higher salary indicates less chance of getting to get partially funding. 
Having a salary is an indicator of good repayment. Low proximity to BMT will 
reduce the cost of monitoring. Therefore, borrowers with low proximity have 
more probability of getting fully funding. Last, years of savings is an indicator of 
borrower’s loyalty. Loyalty will increase trustworthiness. Trustworthy borrowers 
have more probability of getting a full funding than a partial funding.
5.2. Recommendation
This study is expected to solve possible credit-rationing problems for borrowers at 
BOP and highlight several policy recommendations. The policy recommendations 
of this study include: 
a. Creating the eligibility standard of BOP borrowers to get financing.
As the standard of eligibility is important for BMT in the first financing proposal, it 
is recommended that BMT use eligibility as screening in the first financing proposal. 
The eligibility criterion will ensure that only the poor or very poor can participate 
in BMT financing (M. K. Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero, 1997). However, for the 
second financing proposal, BMT must screen through character. Character will 
replace the function of eligibility for the second or additional financing proposal. 
BMT should provide various financial products.
BMT must provide various financial products. Nowadays, people at BOP are 
more critical. They can choose a financial institution provider as they want. Many 
of commercial banks build and create channeling to the microfinance sector. If 
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BMT stay with their previous products without any improvement, they will lose 
out in competition with others. 
b. The government should have extra budget to support BMT
The government must support BMT in several ways. First, the government must 
have a budget to support BMT growth since the purpose of BMT is reducing 
poverty. The condition of lack of money to be distributed to people at BOP must 
be considered by the government. 
A government intervention especially in the rural credit market is needed 
to provide access for the poor through leading credit institutions, producing 
financing programs, and subsidizing margin, together with several interventions 
(Jia, 2010). It is because eradicating poverty and hunger is under the government 
responsibility.
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